Who Runs the International System? Nationality and Leadership in the United Nations Secretariat *

Paul Novosad[†]

Eric Werker[‡]

November 2016

Abstract

National governments frequently pull strings to get their citizens appointed to senior positions in international institutions. We examine, over a 60 year period, the nationalities of the most senior positions in the United Nations Secretariat, ostensibly the world's most representative international institution. The results indicate which states are successful in this zero-sum game, and what national characteristics correlate with power in international institutions. The most overrepresented countries are small, rich democracies like the Nordic countries. Statistically, democracy, investment in diplomacy, foreign aid, and economic/military power are predictors of senior positions—even after controlling for the U.N. staffing mandate of competence and integrity. National control over the United Nations is remarkably sticky; however the influence of the United States has diminished as U.S. ideology has shifted away from its early allies. In spite of the decline in U.S. influence, the Secretariat remains pro-American relative to the world at large.

*We are grateful to Uggi Lee, Daniel Lim, Ian Tomb, Vikram Viswanathan, and Edward Zhong for diligent research assistance. Kristy Buzard, Michael Clemens, Christina Davis, Jeff Friedman, Brian Greenhill, Julia Gray, Diego Hernandez, Tana Johnson, Peter Katzenstein, Michael Levi, Beth Simmons, several staff members of the United Nations, and in particular Ilyana Kuziemko provided helpful suggestions. This project was funded by the National Bureau of Economic Research's Economics of National Security program to Kuziemko and Werker, and Werker thanks the Harvard Business School Division of Research and Faculty Development for support. All errors are our own.

[†]Dartmouth College

[‡]Simon Fraser University

1 Introduction

International organizations have played an important role in the process of development, and the global policy approach to issues of world development is crafted in no small part by international institutions. Not surprisingly, senior positions in international institutions are highly contested by governments seeking to place their nationals into office, and once in these positions, there is evidence that officials act in the interests of their home countries. By studying the outcomes of this contested process, we can identify which nations have been most successful at securing top positions, and how this has changed over time. To make this possible, we assembled new data on the nationalities of the most senior officials in the United Nations Secretariat since the founding of the United Nations. We analyze the determinants of control of the United Nations Secretariat, and as an example, use these data to shed light on the role that the United States has played in its history. We provide new evidence both on the internal dynamics of the United Nations, arguably the world's most representative international institution, and we contribute a new measurement of power in international institutions.

Our research informs two major literatures. First, we provide new evidence on the question of which nations exercise influence in international institutions. While the United Nations ostensibly represents the shared interests of all countries, it was nonetheless established by a particular group of countries—the victors of the second world war—with the goal of sustaining a certain kind of world order (Hoopes & Brinkley 2000). A wide and rich literature has examined, for example, the formation and development of the European Union, trade agreements, and the Bretton Woods financial organizations, with the goal of understanding how nations exercise influence through international institutions. Different scholars have brought different theoretical perspectives to this task, emphasizing the role of state preferences (Moravcsik 1993), state power (Gruber 2000), legitimacy (Schimmelfennig 2001), and

their interactions with institutional design (Steinberg 2002). Our paper does not attempt to offer a parsimonious theory to explain outcomes in international institutions, but instead to demonstrate a way to track relative influence, using the U.N. leadership as a test case. We argue that the nationalities of the Secretariat leadership provide a time-varying proxy for the influence of each country at the United Nations.

Second, we explore the possibility of treating the staffing of international institutions as an outcome of the distribution of power across states. According to John Mearsheimer, realists maintain that international institutions are "basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world" (1994). There is a substantial literature on the measurement of power (Nye 2011b), and a vigorous debate on whether power is even measurable (Guzzini 2013). By identifying the distribution of positions in the Secretariat, we provide an objective measure across all countries of a zero-sum dimension of power, the power to control international institutions, that appears to be of significant concern to governments around the world. This method addresses some of the critiques in the literature on the empirical measurement of power, especially the critique that a focus on military capability is too narrow in scope.

Using multiple data sources, we researched the nationality of each individual references in the United Nations Yearbook (1947-2007) listing of senior officials. We first create a measure of excess representation in the Secretariat, which is the share of senior Secretariat positions held by a country, divided by that country's share of world population. Ranking countries by this measure, we find that the top positions are dominated by rich democracies: the five most overrepresented countries in the Secretariat are Sweden, Norway, Finland, New Zealand, and Ireland. The United States is overrepresented, and China is significantly underrepresented.

Extending the analysis with a multivariate fixed effect model, we examine the factors that give countries more ability to secure these scarce positions. The Charter of the United Nations mandates the selection of staff on the basis of competence and integrity, which we proxy at the country level with college-educated population and freedom from corruption.

The results support the hypothesis that staffing rules limit geographic representation. But these factors alone do not determine who sits in the Secretariat. Drawing on the literature on country influence in international institutions, we include additional measures of total economic output, per capita wealth, military spending, investment in diplomacy, foreign aid spending, and democracy. We find that economic output, diplomacy and foreign aid are the most robust correlates of influence in the Secretariat; democracy, per capita wealth and military expenditure are positive but weaker predictors of influence. The results support hypotheses of international institutions as reflections of global power, but also extend them beyond military power: investment in diplomacy and foreign aid has returns, as does similarity in political system with founding members. The robust diplomacy and aid results suggest that countries can invest in institutional power in a manner that is at least partially orthogonal to military investment and economic output.

Next, we use our measure of senior position nationality to describe the influence of the United States in the Secretariat over the last 60 years. We present three new facts. First, we observe a secular decline in the share of senior positions held by Americans since the 1960s. Second, the secular decline is apparent even if we control for seats held by allies, as proxied by United Nations General Assembly Voting (Gartzke 1998). Third, these senior positions have not been replaced by growing middle income countries, but by citizens of other rich democracies—largely the allies of the United States at the founding of the United Nations. While the world population share of Western Europe and its offshoots fell from 18% in 1965 to 13% in 2005, their share of senior Secretariat positions barely changed, falling from 46% in 1965 only to 45% in 2005.

We then operationalize state preferences (Moravcsik 1997) in order to make sense of these facts. If American and European ideologies were the same as they were in 1950 (as measured by General Assembly voting), the United States would not have experienced any real loss of ally-weighted influence at the Secretariat, as the positions lost by the United

States were on average taken up by its 1950 allies, mainly Western Europe and the Western Offshoots. However, according to our measure, the ideologies of the United States and its 1950 allies have diverged, especially since the 1980s, so the placement of old allies in former U.S. positions has led to a substantial loss in American influence at the United Nations. These findings both reinforce and add nuance to Keohane's (1984) proposition that international institutions can outlast the circumstances determining their creation. The United Nations Secretariat continues to reflect the membership of the U.S.-led alliance that was instrumental in its creation, in spite of that alliance's declining economic and military dominance of the world. But the United Nations Secretariat no longer represents American ideology; American control over the United Nations is now constrained by the allies with which it built the institution.

The methodology of using nationality of senior staff to learn about an unobserved diplomatic struggle is, to our knowledge, novel. This method could be applied to any international institution with sufficient depth of senior staff, such as the World Bank or the African Development Bank. This methodology could allow for new empirical approaches to the study of how individual states exert influence within international institutions, or how those institutions' bureaucracies function (Cox & Jacobson 1973, Barnett & Finnemore 1999). One strand of recent work in this field focuses on the role of major powers in shaping outcomes including loans, agendas, concessions, votes, or peacekeeping scope (Kilby 2011, Kuziemko & Werker 2006, Lim & Vreeland 2013, Stone 2004). Another important strand investigates how and when international organizations, as agents, act independently from their principals, the countries that create and govern them (Copelovitch 2010, Hawkins et al. 2006); one important means is through staffing rules (Cortell & Peterson 2006).

2 Political Economy of the United Nations Secretariat

2.1 What does the Secretariat do?

The United Nations is the primary international organization responsible for maintaining peace and facilitating cooperation among states to resolve issues that require collective action. The United Nations' executive arm is the Secretariat. It serves the other bodies of the United Nations, conducts surveys and research, and communicates with non-state actors such as media and non-government organizations. The Secretariat also manages global peacekeeping operations, houses the U.N. Department of Political Affairs, essentially a ministry of foreign affairs with active policy around the world. While the decision-making powers of the United Nations reside within its deliberative bodies (the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, and Security Council), the Secretariat plays a key role in setting the agenda for those bodies. The content of the resolutions debated in the deliberative bodies originates in the Secretariat, and many of the programs are implemented by organs of the Secretariat. The Secretariat is the main source of economic and political analysis for the General Assembly and Security Council, and operates political field missions which provide knowledge to those bodies. The Secretariat prepares the technical assessments that precede peacekeeping operations and appoints the leaders of peacekeeping operations. These Heads of Mission directly implement peacekeeping operations and report directly to the under-secretary general of the Secretariat.

Given this range of roles, the Secretariat has more decision-making power than its de jure status suggests. In a 1955 address, Secretary General Dag Hammerskjold described this power as follows:

> The United Nations is what member states made it, but within the limits set by government action and government cooperation, much depends on what the Secretariat makes it... [it] has creative capacity. It can introduce new ideas. It

> can, in proper forms, take initiatives. It can put before member governments findings which will influence their actions (Kelen 1968).

The staff of the Secretariat are ostensibly international civil servants who serve the goals of the United Nations rather than their home countries. However, the spoken and unspoken struggle between states to place their nationals in senior positions at the United Nations speaks both to the importance of this creative power of the Secretariat, as well as the widespread belief that Secretariat staff continue to favor the interests of their home countries.

2.2 Staffing the Secretariat

2.2.1 Official Procedures

The Secretary General (SG) heads the United Nations Secretariat, and is selected by the Security Council, with approval from the General Assembly. Under-secretaries general are largely selected by the SG, though need General Assembly approval. The remaining approximately 43,000 staff of the Secretariat are appointed by senior Secretariat officials without direct interaction with the deliberative bodies (Wynes & Zahran 2011).

Appointment of Secretariat officials is guided by two criteria stated in the Charter of the United Nations:

> The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible (United Nations 1945).

Since 1958, internal documents have discussed a "desirable range" of staff that should come from each country, a range which would be based on membership (i.e. some minimum number

of positions per country), population, and assessment of dues, with the largest weight on assessment.[1,2] These desirable ranges apply to the total stock of positions and do not consider seniority; the nationality distribution of senior positions departs more significantly from the desirable range than the distribution of all positions, a situation which the General Assembly has on occasion discussed (Meron 1982).

2.2.2 Unofficial Jockeying

It is widely recognized that the top positions are contested in an intensely political process. The struggle for influence over the appointment of the most recent Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, was widely covered, with China's growing global influence an important factor in the selection of a candidate from Asia (Thant & Scott 2007). Ban's appointed top management team was, according to the *Financial Times*, "dominated by officials from powerful countries" (2007). Among them was then-U.S. ambassador to Indonesia Lynn Pascoe who was to head the political affairs department despite other countries' objections that he was "a State Department guy" (Turner 2007). Three years later, when Briton and former Blair cabinet member Valerie Amos was appointed under-secretary general for humanitarian affairs, a source to the Guardian newspaper observed: "This is a massively significant job, one of the top five at the U.N. [...] It would be unthinkable for Britain not to have one of the top five jobs" (Watt 2010). Competition over other high-level positions is often blatant, as governments support the candidacy of their own nationals (Economist 1989).

Historically, the selection of under-secretaries was an arena of conflict in the Cold War, and frequently discussed in the General Assembly, with Soviets pushing for a transparent division of powers with three under-secretaries representing respectively the Western Block, the Eastern Block and the Non-aligned countries (Reymond 1967). Such a division would

[1]The formula has changed several times; current documents suggest respective weights of 40%, 5% and 55%.

[2]Membership dues owed by members of the United Nations are almost exactly proportional to GDP. Staffing formulae are based on assessment, not on actual dues paid.

make more explicit the allegiance that Secretariat staff often retained to their home countries. The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence routinely published a report entitled, "Soviet Presence in the U.N. Secretariat," (United States Senate 1985) one edition of which claimed,

> The 800 Soviets assigned to the United Nations as international civil servants report directly to the Soviet missions and are part of an organization managed by the Soviet Foreign Ministry, intelligence services, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party. [... They] are involved in shaping conference papers, controlling the flow of news to staff and delegations, influencing delegations seeking Secretariat advice, and aiding Soviet diplomats during conference and other deliberations.

There have been several high profile examples of Secretariat officials acting in the interests of their home countries over those of the United Nations. During the Iraq Oil-for-Food program, which ran from 1996-2003, Secretariat members had significant discretion over which companies would be able to purchase Iraqi oil. Subsequent investigations revealed significant kickbacks and bribery. The French head of the program, Benon Savan, arranged for disproportionate oil allocations to go to French companies and individuals, including several high level French diplomats. A second example involves the Assistant Secretary-General Tun Myat from Myanmar, who was investigated for assisting a Myanmarese company in selling teak wood into Iraq under the same program. While Myat was ultimately not charged for his actions, he was revealed to have used his connections in the Secretariat to fast-track his compatriots' requests to Programme staff, ultimately resulting in contracts being awarded to the Myanmarese company. The Inquiry Committee into the Oil-for-Food Programme observed that, "it is commonplace at the United Nations for staff members to be contacted for assistance by private parties from their home country" (United Nations 2005).

The politicization of the Secretariat is recognized and debated within the United Nations as well. In its own newsletter, the United Nations reported, "The United Nations has increasingly become a political arena where high officials engage in political give-and-take and where 'interest groups' lobby for their country's interests... Political appointees are frequently not loyal to the United Nations, but to their respective governments, upon which they depend for further reward or punishment" (Finger & Hanan 1980). Increasing evidence suggests that the national identities of bureaucrats affect the decision-making of institutions (Kaja & Werker 2010, Johns 2007).

3 Data and Specifications

3.1 Constructing the Database of Secretariat Positions

We compiled data on Secretariat staffing from the annual Yearbook of the United Nations, which summarizes the annual activities of all the organs of the United Nations. The Appendix of the U.N. Yearbook lists the names and titles of the most senior staff in the Secretariat and Specialized Agencies, beginning with the Secretary General. [3] Using the name and position of each person listed, we researched their nationality, drawing on directories (such as *Who's Who in the United Nations*), media articles and other historical documents.

To verify that our list accurately captured the most senior positions in the Secretariat of the United Nations, and to rank the positions in terms of importance, we hired two independent consultants, each of whom had decades of experience working with the United Nations.[4] Both consultants confirmed that our list did not have significant lacunae, and independently assigned each position a weight on a scale of 1 to 6 reflecting the relative

[3] Appendix Figure A1 displays the number of positions listed over time, along with the number of those positions for which we were able to verify the nationality of the position-holder.

[4] The experts preferred to remain anonymous given the potential political sensitivity of this study. Their position ratings will be published along with the dataset of official nationalities.

importance of that position. The Secretaries General were assigned a ranking of 6, the under-secretaries were assigned 5, and so on. Using the mean importance rank of the two consultants, we created a second measure of Secretariat representation, which is the share of positions held by each country in a given year, weighted by the importance of each position held. We rescaled this measure so that it sums to one in each year.

We added several other country-year variables: (i) GDP and population (World Development Indicators, Penn World Tables); (ii) stock of people with tertiary education (Barro & Lee 2012); (iii) the Worldwide Governance Indicators (of which freedom from corruption is a component) (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2011); (iv) the Combined Polity Score measure of democracy from the Polity IV database (Marshall & Jaggers 2002); (v) state military expenditure and the Composite Index of National Capability from Correlates of War v3.0 (Singer 1987); (vi) an annual count of the number of foreign embassies operated by each country as a proxy for national investment in international diplomacy (the Diplomatic Contacts database from Rhamey et al. (2010)); and (vii) net official development assistance by donor, from OECD. Finally, we calculated assessments of dues to the United Nations using data on national GDP, population, U.N. membership and the formulae described in Section 2.2.1.[5]

Table 1 displays summary statistics of all measures used.

[Table 1 about here.]

3.2 Measuring Representation

We define a country's raw representation as the share of Secretariat positions held in a given year by that country's nationals. We consider an alternate measure that weights each position by the expert assessment of its importance, but it does not substantively change any

[5]The governance measure is missing data before 1994, so we impute backward from the earliest available year to avoid dropping a large number of observations when we include this variable.

of our findings. We define excess representation as the ratio of a country's raw representation to its share of world population in a given year. We use the excess representation measure only in generating the descriptive statistics and country rankings; the remaining analysis uses the raw representation measure.

3.2.1 The Staffing Mandate of the United Nations and Other Factors Influencing Representation

Two anecdotes from the early years of the United Nations (both from Ameri 1996) highlight the challenges of achieving fair geographic coverage of top officials. In the early years of the United Nations, citizens of the United States held a disproportionate share of positions in the Secretariat—from 20-25% of all senior positions in the 1950s. A factor contributing to this was that the location of headquarters in New York made it difficult to recruit nationals outside of North America.[6] A second common factor in early staffing decisions was that many countries had a shortage of individuals with sufficient education and experience to fill a senior position at the United Nations. Governments were often invited to recommend their nationals for senior positions, but declined to do so on the grounds that they did not have capable staff to spare.

As inscribed in the Charter, the primary official criteria for staff selection are efficiency, competence, and integrity; equitable geographic distribution is secondary. We do not directly observe the caliber of individual bureaucrats in the Secretariat. However, we can to some extent control for the pool of available candidates from each country with country-level measures that proxy for the staff selection criteria. To proxy for efficiency and competence, we use a measure of human capital: the stock of individuals with tertiary education (often a prerequisite for employment at the United Nations). To proxy for integrity, we use the freedom from corruption measure from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann,

[6]It would be incorrect to view this as a historical accident; the locating of U.N. headquarters in New York occurred because of the United States' position as the dominant world power.

Kraay & Mastruzzi 2011). The latter is motivated by Fisman & Miguel (2007), who found that U.N. diplomats' compliance with law in New York was correlated with the corruption level in their home countries. Finally, we include the assessment of dues, given its key role in the desirable representation formulae.

Our model takes the form:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * POPULATION_{it} + \beta_2 * EDUC_{it} + \beta_3 * CORRUPTION_{it} + \beta_4 * DUES_{it} + \zeta X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \tag{1}$$

Where Y_{it} is a measure of representation, $POPULATION$, $EDUC$, $CORRUPTION$ and $DUES$ reflect the staffing mandate of the United Nations, and X_{it} is a vector of additional factors that we would like to test, which are wealth (GDP per capita), traditional international power (military spending), diplomacy (as proxied by the number of embassies run by countries), foreign aid spending, and democracy.

A desirable empirical specification should have two main characteristics. First, all predictive factors should be treated as zero sum, since the share of Secretariat positions is also zero sum. In other words, increasing a country's population by 10% should not affect our prediction of that country's representation if the population of all other countries has also increased by the same 10%. To achieve this, we rescale all observations on Secretariat positions, population, assessments of dues, human capital stock, military spending, diplomatic contacts, and aid spending to convert these to shares of the world total of each value. For instance, instead of gross military spending, we use share of global military spending. For the remaining variables (democracy, freedom from corruption, GDP per capita), there is no notion of a "global total;" to make these zero sum, we rescale them so that observations each year have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for both transformed and untransformed variables.

Second, we need to control for the fact that many of the national variables we describe, including Secretariat positions, exhibit significant serial correlation, since they are often held

for multiple years. To avoid overcounting highly similar observations, we cluster standard errors by country in the time series regressions, and by decade in the country fixed effect regressions.

4 Who Runs the United Nations?

4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Figure 1 shows the excess representation of the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and Japan. As discussed above, the United States had a disproportionate share of positions at the inception of the United Nations, a share which fell significantly but then stabilized in the 1980s. Japan and Germany had little representation following the end of the second world war, but have steadily risen in prominence, surpassing the United States in excess representation by the 1980s.[7] The Soviet Union was almost never overrepresented at the United Nations, in part because of Stalin's significant efforts to undermine the institution in the early years (Finger 1975). The breakup of the Soviet Union led to a further drop in Russia's influence in the Secretariat. China has been and continues to be dramatically underrepresented in the U.N. Secretariat—with an average over all years of only 1% of senior positions in the Secretariat.[8]

[Figure 1 about here.]

Figure 2 shows the world population share and share of U.N. Secretariat positions of the Western European powers and the Western Offshoots (Canada, the United States, New Zealand, and Australia). While the Western countries' share of world population and GDP have been steadily declining since the creation of the United Nations, their control over

[7]This timing coincides with Japan's "internationalization" policies during the Nakasone administration, which aimed to increase Japan's role in global affairs (George 1993).

[8]Figure A2 shows a version of the figure with raw representation, defined as the total number of senior positions in the Secretariat, rather than excess representation.

the U.N. Secretariat has not wavered; in 2007 they continued to hold 45% of Secretariat positions, while their world population share fell from 18% to 12%. The graph shows that in spite of the widely discussed rise to international prominence of middle income countries like the BRICs, Western Europe and its offshoots have not lost control over this key U.N. body. This provides empirical evidence from a non-Bretton Woods institution supporting the claim that China set out to create the BRICS bank and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank because of underrepresentation in post-war international institutions (Economist 2014).

[Figure 2 about here.]

Figure 3 displays scatterplots of the share of positions in the Secretariat against log population and log assessment. There is a clear upward sloping relationship in both graphs, but many countries are far from the 45 degree line. The R^2 measure for the regression of Secretariat share on population share is 0.11, while for representation on assessment of dues it is 0.70. In the bivariate analysis, payment of dues (which is almost a linear function of GDP) is a much better indicator of Secretariat control than population.

[Figure 3 about here.]

Table 2 presents excess representation in the Secretariat, by country, averaged over all years.[9] To save space, we list the top 20 countries, and all other countries with an average population (over all years in the sample) higher than 20 million.[10] Excess representation is defined as the ratio of a country's share of Secretariat positions to its share of world population, and is proportional to a country's vertical distance from the 45 degree line in the top panel of Figure 3. The Nordic countries dominate the list, occupying 4 of the top 6 positions. Since 1950, Sweden has had on average 0.1% of world population and 0.8% of world GDP, but has held 4.3% of senior positions in the Secretariat, including a Secretary-General from 1953-61. Western countries are also overrepresented, with the United States,

[9] Appendix Table A2 lists countries ranked by their total number of senior Secretariat positions, without taking population into account.

[10] Appendix Table A1 shows the complete list with all countries included.

Canada, and Great Britain all overrepresented by a factor of 2 or greater. Large, poor countries are significantly underrepresented; India, China, and Indonesia each have a world population share four or more times greater than their Secretariat position share.

[Table 2 about here.]

The high ranks of small democracies (especially Nordic countries) are consistent with literature on small, open economies, which finds that they take on additional insurance against negative shocks given their dependence on outside factors(Rodrik 2014). There may also be a global perception that Nordic bureaucrats can be trusted to behave honestly and fairly. The high incidence of Nordic countries thus may not be the result of an exertion of power on their part, but a consequence of their fairness and reliability. Nevertheless, finding themselves well represented in these senior positions gives the Nordic countries an opportunity to exercise power over international institutions; they may find it to their benefit to continue to cultivate a reputation for impartiality, bestowing power through legitimacy.

4.2 Determinants of Secretariat Leadership

Table 3 presents estimates from a panel regression of annual Secretariat representation on population, human capital, freedom from corruption, and assessment of dues to the United Nations as described by Equation 1. The purpose of this test is to assess to what extent the composition of Secretariat leadership is contrained by countries' scarcity of individuals who meet the official qualifications of senior positions. An observation is a country-year, and standard errors are clustered at the country level. Columns 1 through 4 add independent variables sequentially. Column 5 repeats the estimation with all variables included, but rather than a count of senior positions, the outcome variable weights each position by the importance of that position, as judged by a third-party expert. This last measure is rescaled so the total number of positions remains one.

[Table 3 about here.]

The coefficient on population is insignificant in all specifications. Human capital enters positively with statistical significance in all but one column; we discuss its multicollinearity with assessment of dues below. A 1 percentage point increase in a country's share of the global stock of college-educated people is associated with a 0.2 to 0.4 percentage point increase in representation in the Secretariat. The freedom from corruption indicator is also positive and significant in all specifications: countries with low corruption and good governance are better represented in the Secretariat. Assessment of dues also enters positively and significantly. Column 5 indicates that these results are robust to using importance weighted measures of Secretariat representation. The results lend weight to the importance of the staffing mandate of the United Nations, suggesting that the supply of individuals of high competence and integrity plays a role in the composition of the U.N. Secretariat. The role of assessment of dues is more ambiguous, given that dues are almost perfectly correlated with GDP. The importance of this variable could therefore be interpreted either as a one-dollar-one-vote relationship between funding and leadership, or could reflect the importance of economic power as a determinant of control over international institutions.

The analysis thus far uses both cross-sectional and time series variation in representation. Table 4 presents estimates from a model with country fixed effects, and thus controls for unobserved country-level characteristics (but also eliminates the interesting variation between countries). The results on population, assessment of dues and human capital are sustained; the effect of corruption is not visible in the time series alone, largely because it is available for only a third of the years and does not change significantly over time. The persistence of these treatment coefficients in a fixed effect specification lends weight to a causal interpretation: GDP and human capital are not only correlated with influence over the U.N. in the cross section, but the countries that have increased their GDP and human capital over time have gained Secretariat leadership positions as well.

[Table 4 about here.]

We now examine the role of factors beyond the official staffing mandate of the United Nations. Scholars like Stone (2011) have made a strong case that powerful states exert outsized influence over international organizations. We choose several salient variables to capture different dimensions of what it might mean to be "powerful," and thus able to exert influence through additional staff members beyond that prescribed in the staffing mandate. We first consider wealth, which we proxy with per capita GDP, as distinct from total economic output which is already proxied by assessment of dues. Wealth can be an instrument for the exercise of power, and could be correlated with control over international institutions to the extent to which that control can be purchased (Zakaria 1999). To capture coercive power, we include total military expenditure, and for a proxy of investment in diplomacy, we use the number of foreign embassies operated by each country (Rhamey et al. 2010). Foreign aid has been cited by British Prime Minister David Cameron, among others, as an important source of soft power (Cameron 2015), so we include a country's official development assistance budget. Finally, to capture the element of power that results from competition and emulation (as opposed to coercion) (Simmons, Dobbin & Garrett 2006), we include a country's level of democracy as a proxy for being part of the dominant intellectual ideology.

Table 5 shows the relationship between Secretariat representation and per capita wealth, military spending, investment in diplomacy, aid, and democracy, controlling for the variables used in the staffing mandate regressions above. Human capital, military expenditure, GDP and assessment of dues are all highly colinear, which makes it difficult to separate their individual effects.[11] Columns 1 through 3 show that these variables are positive, significant and very similar in magnitude when included separately.

Both diplomacy and aid enter with positive and highly significant point estimates, suggesting that investment in soft power (Nye 1990) is a key factor in determining representation

[11]The correlation coefficients are $\rho_{GDP,dues} = 0.98$; $\rho_{dues,tertiaryed} = 0.92$; $\rho_{dues,militaryshare} = 0.89$; $\rho_{militaryshare,tertiaryed} = 0.84$.

in the U.N. Secretariat. A 1 percentage point increase in a country's share of the world's embassies is associated with a 0.5 to 0.6 percentage point increase in Secretariat representation, and a 1 percentage point increase in a country's share of global aid spending is associated with a 0.1 to 0.2 percentage point increase in representation. Democracy is also positively correlated with representation, but the point estimates are very small: a 10 point change in Polity is associated with a 0.05 percentage point increase in representation. Wealth is positively correlated with representation, but with no statistical significance. When assessment, human capital stock and military spending are included together (column 4), the education variable dominates, but we are reluctant to infer too much from this since it is based on a small amount of variation between these three measures. The inverse corruption proxy of governance is no longer correlated with Secretariat positions; it appears to have been proxying wealth which is highly correlated with a lack of corruption. We also tested whether neutrality predicts representation, by adding a dummy variable that defines a country as neutral if it was not a founding member of NATO or the Warsaw Pact. The coefficient on this variable is small and insignificant, and its inclusion does not change any of the above .[12]

[Table 5 about here.]

5 The United States and the United Nations

In this section, we use our measure of control over senior Secretariat positions to examine the history of the influence of the United States in the U.N. Secretariat. As Figure 1 depicts, the United States was significantly overrepresented in the early years of the United Nations' existence. Its share of positions declined steadily until around 1980, and has since remained relatively constant. The time series for West Germany and Japan is a striking contrast; for twenty years after the second world war they did not hold a single position between them;

[12]Results are available from the authors on request.

but since the 1970s, both countries have risen from in prominence to a point where their share of senior positions is more than double their global population share.

To complete this picture, we need to take state preferences into account (Moravcsik 1993, Moravcsik 1997). Countries may form coalitions to advance shared interests, and will prefer to have allies in seats of power rather than rivals. Consider the campaign to prevent global warming. A state like Palau might be equally satisfied between holding a Secretariat position itself or having Maldives hold a position, since both low-lying island states share the same goal of preventing climate change. The United States might be content to have Canadians and New Zealanders staff the peacekeeping department, if their outlook, strategy, and judgments would be similar to Americans'. Our measure of American decline in the United States Secretariat could be overstated if the positions lost by Americans were taken up by their allies.

A good preference-weighted measure of influence in the Secretariat will (i) be increasing both in own positions and in positions of allies; and (ii) put the highest weight on the allies with the greatest similarity of preferences. We can define, at time t, the similarity of preferences between the Secretariat and a given country j by the following expression:

$$\phi_{j,SECRETARIAT,t} = \sum_{i \in I} \big(POSITIONS_{i,t} * \phi_{i,j,t}\big), \tag{2}$$

where $POSITIONS_{i,t}$ is the share of positions held by country i at time t and $\phi_{i,j,t}$ is a measure of the similarity of preferences between country i and country j in year t, with $\phi_{i,i,t} = 1$. In words, for country j, we first calculate its similarity of preference with every other nation in the world – this is $\phi_{i,j,t}$ for each country i. We then weight these preference similarities by the share of each country's positions in the Secretariat, to get the similarity between the Secretariat and country j. Thus if a country i has very similar preferences to country j (i.e. $\phi_{i,j,t}$ is large), *and* a large number of seats in the Secretariat (i.e. $POSITIONS_{i,t}$ is large),

then country j's influence in the Secretariat would be increased by country i's positions. Conversely, positions held by opponents ($\phi_{i,j,t} < 0$) decrease a country's Secretariat influence. If a country held every position in the Secretariat, then $\phi_{j,SECRETARIAT,t}$ would be equal to one. Under this measure, positions for perfect allies (i.e. countries with identical preferences) are as valuable as positions for a country itself.

Many cross-country measures of preference similarities have been proposed; none are perfect. We proxy similarity of preferences with similarity in voting at the U.N. General Assembly, as we think this measure comes the closest to measuring the relevant dimension of preferences for the management of the Secretariat. Following Gartzke (2006), we define similarity of preferences as:

$$\phi_{i,j} = 1 - 2 * \frac{d}{d^{max}}, \tag{3}$$

where d is the number of times that i votes against j, and d^{max} is the number of General Assembly votes. $\phi_{i,j}$ and $\phi_{i,SECRETARIAT}$ are thus both bounded between -1 and 1. The assumption behind our formulation is that officials from two countries with identical preferences over General Assembly resolutions will behave in the same manner if given senior positions in the Secretariat. While there are documented weaknesses in General Assembly voting data as a proxy for preferences, it remains the methodology of choice in many papers in political science and economics (Voeten 2013). The weighting method described in Equation 2 would nevertheless work equally well with a different measure of preference similarity.

Defining the United States as "country j," the solid lines in Figure 4 show American preference-similarity with the Secretariat over time (in black), along with the unadjusted U.S. Secretariat representation measure (in gray) from Figure 1. The measures track each other until the mid-1960s. From 1965 to 1980, the number of positions held by Americans declines, but America's alliance-weighted representation remains constant, indicating that

lost American positions are being filled by American allies. Around 1980, U.S. alliance-weighted representation falls in the Secretariat and drops below zero, indicating that the average senior official in the Secretariat is from a state that is an opponent of the U.S. rather than an ally. From 1981 to 2007, the Secretariat is on average staffed by officials from states that are opposed to the United States, with a slight upturn during the Clinton administration and a monotonic fall during the subsequent Bush years.

[Figure 4 about here.]

These changes in alliance-weighted control of the Secretariat could be driven by either a change in composition of the Secretariat or a change in preference similarity across countries. In other words, a country loses influence when (i) it or its allies lose Secretariat positions; or (ii) countries that already have positions become more opposed to the country in question. We can test between these two alternatives by holding preferences constant from the 1950s. This scenario is represented by the dashed line in Figure 4. When we hold alliances constant, the U.S. decline almost completely disappears, indicating that all of the lost American positions were taken by its 1950s allies, but that these allies no longer share ideology with the United States. America's declining influence is therefore due to a divergence of preference between the United States and its allies, perhaps driven by trends in domestic politics (Moravcsik 1993). These results suggest that, with the exception of declining U.S. influence, the post-war balance of control at the United Nations has been largely static over a 60-year period, in spite of significant changes in both the influence of specific countries at the United Nations and the balance of global economic power over this period. This finding is consistent with the idea that the characteristics of international organizations persist beyond the conditions of their origination (Keohane 1984, Ikenberry 2001).

5.1 Measuring Institutional Bias

We have shown a secular decline in U.S. control over the United Nations Secretariat from 1950 to the present. The average senior official in the Secretariat is from a state that is weakly opposed to the U.S., but it remains possible that the Secretariat has a pro-U.S. bias relative to the world. In other words, a U.N. that is opposed to the United States might be even more opposed to the United States if the Secretariat represented all countries equally. In this section we describe a method to measure the international bias of an institution.

First, we generate a measure of the similarity of preferences between a country and the rest of the world. This is analogous to $\phi_{i,SECRETARIAT}$ above: it is defined as the population-weighted mean of each country's preference similarity with the base country. We label this measure $\phi_{i,WORLD}$:

$$\phi_{USA,WORLD,t} = \sum_{i \in I} \big(POPULATION_{i,t} * \phi_{i,USA,t}\big), \tag{4}$$

where $POPULATION_{i,t}$ is country i's share of world population at time t.[13]

If the nationality distribution of senior officials in the Secretariat was representative of the global population, then $\phi_{USA,WORLD}$ would be equal to $\phi_{USA,SECRETARIAT}$, defined above. We define the bias of an institution toward a country as the difference between the country's influence in the institution and the that country's preference similarity with the rest of the world:

$$BIAS_{USA,SECRETARIAT,t} = \phi_{USA,SECRETARIAT,t} - \phi_{USA,WORLD,t}. \tag{5}$$

We plot Secretariat $BIAS$ toward the United States over time in Figure 5. The figure shows that relative to the world as a whole, the U.N. Secretariat has been consistently biased toward the United States. If the staffing of the Secretariat were proportional to national

[13] As above, this measure could be used with any measure of preference similarity.

populations, the United States would have even less influence in the institution. In other words, despite increased U.S. isolation, the leadership of the United Nations Secretariat is more closely aligned with the U.S. than the world as a whole.

[Figure 5 about here.]

This methodology can be used to examine the bias of any international organization, given data on the nationalities of key officials. As an example, we analyze the bureaucratic leadership of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) during the 1970s and early 1980s. This was the second United Nations agency from which the United States withdrew, in 1984 (Joyner & Lawson 1986).[14] UNESCO's General Conference regularly adopted anti-Israel resolutions, sponsored disarmament activities that the Americans thought were biased in favor of Soviet positions, and promoted restrictions on the freedom of the press through the controversial New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) (Jacobson 1984, Puchala 1990). UNESCO's Secretariat played a decisive role in the organization's stance and direction (Joyner & Lawson 1986). In Figure 6 we compute UNESCO's pro-U.S. bias and compare it with the U.N. Secretariat through 1988, the last year for which we have leadership data on UNESCO. As can be seen in the figure, UNESCO is notably less pro-American than the Secretariat. This imbalance would be significantly greater if not for a single directorship held by the United States for most of this period, a position which likely played a role in scuttling the NWICO effort.

[Figure 6 about here.]

[14]The U.S. withdrew from the International Labor Organization from 1978-80.

6 Leadership Nationality as Measure of Power in International Institutions

The search for objective measures of power that are comparable across countries goes back at least to the eighteenth century (Gulick 1955, cited in Baldwin 2013). Capability-based measures became ever more complex, as reflected in Morgenthau (1948), culminating in Cline's formula (1975), which was a nonlinear combination of population, territory, income, energy, minerals, manufacturing, food, trade, as well as strategy and will. Cline's measure was used by the U.S. army among others to estimate long run trends in national capabilities (Tellis et al. 2000).

The capability-based approach has been critiqued by scholars across a number of disciplines, who argue that power is situationally specific and relational and therefore "not objectively measurable"(Guzzini 2009). Contrary to the analysts who count national manpower and resources, Guzzini argues that power is not fungible; what generates power in one context may not generate power in another. For example, U.S. military resources may not be usable against friends as they would be against enemies.

A key development in this literature over the last half century has been the description and categorization of different types of power. Dahl's 1957 seminal study defined a notion of compulsory power as the ability of A to get B to do what B otherwise would not do. Bachrach & Baratz (1962) argued that there was a second face of power: the ability to set the agenda. Lukes (1974) added a third face: the ability to influence others' initial preferences. More recently, Barnett & Duvall (2005)'s typology suggests four faces of power. While the traditional capability-based approach is well captured by the idea of compulsory power, control over the staffing of international institutions is closer to Barnett and Duvall's Institutional and Productive Powers: first, the ability to control actors through their diffuse interactions in institutions, and second, the ability to influence "systems of knowledge and

discursive practices of broad and general social scope" (Barnett & Duvall 2005), a reasonable description of the Secretariat's global agenda-setting role.

The outcomes of wars provide information about the military capabilities of warring countries. Our proposition is that the outcomes of diplomatic struggles over the leadership of international institutions analogously provides information about the underlying capabilities of the competing states to influence those institutions. Steinberg (2002) noted that state powers "extrinsic" to the rules of an international organization have the effect of "invisibly weighting the decision-making process," generating unequal outcomes. We seek to make visible those weights. We are thus proposing a new, objective measure of power in international institutions.

Our approach brings together two traditions of scholarship that have diverged in recent decades: the measurement of power, traditionally a realist undertaking, and the treatment of power as multidimensional. Our scope is narrow. We focus on the realization of a single dimension of state power: power in international institutions. We cannot predict whether one state can exert power over another in a general sense (e.g. in a war), and our measure is only relevant to the extent that control over international institutions is perceived by states as being important.

With that qualification, our method has several desirable characteristics. First, we are measuring a global outcome that involves nearly all countries in the world, measured with equal accuracy for all countries. Second, it is a continuous measure, available each year that we observe the senior staff positions in the institution of choice, allowing us to observe changes over time. These features give researchers a new opportunity to study the expression of an arguably increasingly important dimension of power in a panel data setting.

The main weakness of United Nations Secretariat leadership as a measure of power is that countries do not equally value the United Nations, so some will exert less effort to secure senior positions in the organization. While the Secretariat is one of the most representative

and central institutions of the international system, it is clearly not the case that every country puts in the same level of resources to get staff into key positions. The measure is therefore a combination of the desire and the ability to influence international outcomes. Nevertheless, countries that can obtain these positions at a lower cost can be considered more powerful (Harsanyi 1962, cited in Baldwin 2013), and are likely to obtain more positions, all other things equal.

A second possible deficiency in the alliance-weighted measure as an indicator of power is that it would accord the same amount of power to a small country and a large country with very similar preferences. Surely Sweden exerts more control over the United Nations than Iceland, even if their voting records are very similar. Yet from the perspective of their individual governments, there may not be a major difference in terms of whether one country or the other is exercising agency at the U.N.. In Moravcsik (1993), outcomes in intergovernmental negotiations are determined by preferences and bargaining power, and how they interact. Having similar preferences to larger countries would allow smaller countries to focus on those areas in which their preference intensity might be higher, implying this might not be a deficiency after all. Nevertheless, one possible remedy would be to increase the weight on own seats as compared to allies' seats, which would restore the expected rankings.

Finally, we consider whether our measure of influence in the United Nations Secretariat can shed light on one of the most public debates in the field of power and international relations: whether the United States' power is in decline. As Joseph Nye wrote in, "The Decline and Fall of America's Decline and Fall" (2011a), America's decline has been frequently anticipated: first the Soviets in the 1950s and 1960s, then the Japanese in the 1980s, and now the Chinese have all been predicted to "get the better of America." Taking the long view, Paul Kennedy had predicted decline (1989) but even by 2012 many prominent writers were unconvinced (Lieber 2012). Related, Keohane (1984) argued that the decline of U.S. hegemony occurred through the 1970s. A parallel, and sometimes overlapping debate has

been occurring on whether we are in an era of "American Empire" (Nexon & Wright 2007). The breadth of opinions leaves open the question of whether America's power is in decline, fluctuating, or even in ascent.

The United States structured the international system after W.W.II to help enforce the so-called Pax Americana. With the United Nations and the Bretton Woods organizations, the United States, wrote John Ikenberry, "spun a web of institutions that connected other states to an emerging American-dominated economic and security order" (Ikenberry 2001). The plan may never have been to dominate the individual institutions once they matured but rather to share them with other states who subscribed to the American worldview. While this view seems plausible for the Cold War years, the notion of a "Western Europe and offshoot" alliance in recent international affairs is less obvious. The United States often has significant disagreement with European countries in matters of international organization, with Americans becoming increasingly unilateralist and Europeans multilateralists (Rubenfeld 2004).

Our measure of Secretariat representation offers an objective and consistent methodology for contributing to this debate. Our evidence shows that the United States has fewer senior positions in the UN Secretariat than it used to, and less influence, even after controlling for the positions held by its allies, such that the Secretariat is no longer a projection of U.S. power. The Secretariat is as pro-Western as ever, but this is not to say that the balance of power is entirely static: it is the former allies of the United States that now control the institution rather than America itself. In assisting in the creation of an organization that would be dominated by the West rather than dominated by America (Ikenberry 2001), the United States in the 1940s may have constrained its own future administrations to be more Wilsonian than they would otherwise be.

7 Conclusion

In 1946, Norwegian Trygve Lie was made the first Secretary General of the United Nations, in part because of the strong Soviet opinion that the position should go to someone who was neither British, French, nor American (Thant & Scott 2007). The Nordic countries have since continued to dominate the senior ranks of the United Nations, perhaps because their citizens are perceived as neutral and trustworthy. It may be no accident that the bureaucratic arms of the United Nations tend toward an ideology that is not dissilimar to that of the Nordic states. To the extent that international institutions constrain the actions of states, this may put the Nordic countries in a far more influential international position than their economic or military strength would suggest.

We have argued that countries with greater ability to influence international organizations will be more successful in placing their nationals into senior positions, and that this is an important aspect of state power. Since these positions are scarce and central to the operation of the United Nations, the resulting allocation of senior positions gives us information on countries' capabilities in the competition for influence in the international system. In spite of the modesty of its setting, this measure of power has some advantages over traditional capability-based measures.

We find that democracies and countries that invest in bilateral diplomacy and foreign aid are the most effective at placing staff in the Secretariat—even after controlling for monetary contributions to the U.N. and the staffing mandate of competence and integrity. This suggests that exercising influence via a multilateral institution may be a complement to exercising it through bilateral soft power. Examining our measure over time, we find that Western Europe and its offshoots have retained control over a disproportionate share of positions in the Secretariat, even while their share of global GDP and population has fallen.

Going further, we put forward a measure of representation that takes shared preferences

between countries into account. We examine the alliance-weighted representation of the United States and find that American influence has been in decline since the formation of the United Nations, especially since 1980, and that the growing ideological distance between the United States and its 1950 allies is the key factor in this decline. However, the Secretariat remains weakly biased toward the interests of the United States, when compared with the interests of the world as a whole.

Our contribution to the great debates in international relations is primarily methodological and demonstrative. The paper is first and foremost an empirical approach that can be used to test various hypotheses coming from different schools of international relations. For those studying power in the international system, this paper may lead to new tests being designed for hypotheses other than that which we explored here. For instance, what are the determinants of power in different international spheres? How do major events change the distribution of power? These questions may be explored through datasets other than the U.N. Secretariat but with a similar approach of identifying the "invisible weights" of global governance. And for those analyzing state interactions and institutional outcomes, the panel-data format of the data we bring to bear permits a complementary approach to the case studies that have sourced the large part of the evidence in these debates thus far.

This paper is not a conclusive operationalization of power, or a comprehensive answer to the question of which countries exert the most power in international institutions. Rather, it attempts to plumb the rich information hidden in plain sight, which is the national composition of the senior staff of the world's most global institution. This information offers a quantifiable approach to help understand how states interact in a globalized context.

Table 1

Summary statistics

Variable	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**	**Min**	Max	N
Number of senior Secretariat positions	0.4	1.0	0.0	11.0	8933
Share of senior Secretariat positions	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.28	8933
GDP (million USD)	128,862	640,398	30	13,983,709	6120
GDP share	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.45	6120
Population (millions)	29.9	103.5	0.1	1,311.0	8519
Population share	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.23	8519
Population with higher ed (million)	0.72	3.11	0.00	56.16	7338
Human capital share	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.43	7338
Inverse corruption index	-0.1	1.0	-2.2	2.6	1198
Inverse corruption (rescaled)	0.0	1.0	-2.0	2.7	1198
UN Fee Assessment	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.33	6120
Military expenditure (thousand USD)	4,510	24,619	0	552,568	6732
Military spending share	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.52	6732
Democracy (Polity)	0.3	7.5	-10.0	10.0	6857
Democracy (Polity, rescaled)	-0.0	1.0	-2.2	1.7	6857
GDP Per Capita	3,789	7,649	38	82,020	6120
GDP Per Capita (rescaled)	-0.0	1.0	-0.9	6.0	6120
Diplomatic contacts	36	29	0	156	6080
Diplomatic contacts (share)	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.04	6080

Table 2

Secretariat excess representation, all years

Rank	Country	Share of positions	Share of world population	Excess Representation
1	Sweden	0.0428	.0019753	21.67
2	Norway	0.0180	.0009621	18.69
3	Finland	0.0206	.0011492	17.90
4	New Zealand	0.0114	.0007137	15.97
5	Ireland	0.0109	.000794	13.67
6	Denmark	0.0150	.0012042	12.43
7	Panama	0.0050	.0004293	11.68
8	Jamaica	0.0047	.0004848	9.72
9	Switzerland	0.0118	.0014943	7.93
10	Uruguay	0.0053	.0006866	7.68
11	Sierra Leone	0.0056	.0007485	7.44
12	Jordan	0.0037	.0005083	7.27
13	Canada	0.0382	.0055127	6.93
14	Ghana	0.0178	.0026361	6.75
15	Botswana	0.0015	.0002213	6.63
16	Greece	0.0149	.0022546	6.62
17	Chile	0.0161	.0025251	6.38
18	Austria	0.0117	.0018319	6.38
19	Tunisia	0.0083	.0014623	5.70
20	Senegal	0.0068	.0012993	5.27
22	Australia	0.0150	.0033014	4.55
24	United Kingdom	0.0581	.013564	4.28
29	Argentina	0.0224	.0064112	3.49
36	France	0.0343	.0126196	2.72
38	United States	0.1292	.0525994	2.46
44	Italy	0.0264	.0131747	2.00
46	Egypt	0.0173	.0101469	1.70
51	Colombia	0.0082	.0058941	1.39
52	Pakistan	0.0259	.0188364	1.37
53	Poland	0.0100	.0081193	1.23
56	Myanmar	0.0085	.0074624	1.14
62	South Africa	0.0060	.0063281	0.95
63	Germany	0.0158	.0188118	0.84
64	Iran	0.0072	.0087606	0.82
66	Philippines	0.0085	.0108115	0.79
67	Japan	0.0206	.0264087	0.78
68	Nigeria	0.0131	.0168746	0.78
69	Russian Federation	0.0237	.0320531	0.74
75	Sudan	0.0030	.00459	0.66
76	Tanzania	0.0029	.0043153	0.66
78	Mexico	0.0091	.0144116	0.63
81	Spain	0.0048	.0085298	0.57
83	Brazil	0.0131	.0264647	0.49
85	Turkey	0.0045	.0100949	0.44
86	Korea, Rep.	0.0034	.0081977	0.42
89	India	0.0447	.1552114	0.29
90	Indonesia	0.0055	.0328688	0.17
91	Bangladesh	0.0032	.0203401	0.16
92	Thailand	0.0008	.009983	0.08
94	Ethiopia	0.0005	.0088029	0.05
95	China	0.0086	.2162004	0.04
96	Congo, Dem. Rep.	0.0000	.0065138	0.00
96	Romania	0.0000	.0049783	0.00
96	Ukraine	0.0000	.0113596	0.00
96	Vietnam	0.0000	.011848	0.00

Table 3

Correlates of U.N. Secretariat representation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Population share	0.211	-0.005	0.011	0.018	0.008
	(0.141)	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.077)	(0.075)
Human capital share		0.398	0.370	0.168	0.229
		(0.014)***	(0.014)***	(0.110)	(0.089)**
Inverse corruption (rescaled)			0.004	0.003	0.003
			(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
UN Fee Assessment				0.259	0.217
				(0.142)*	(0.115)*
Constant	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
N	8519	7306	7170	5464	5464
r2	0.08	0.47	0.52	0.55	0.57

$^{*}p < 0.10,^{**}p < 0.05,^{***}p < 0.01$

The table shows coefficients from estimation of Equation 1, with the share of positions in the United Nations Secretariat as the dependent variable. Each observation is a country-year. The dependent variable in column 5 is the share of importance-weighted secretariat representation. Population, human capital and assessment of dues are represented as world shares.

Table 4

Correlates of U.N. Secretariat representation (Country Fixed Effects)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Population share	0.835	-0.043	-0.021	0.524	0.402
	(0.719)	(0.555)	(0.564)	(0.581)	(0.534)
Human capital share		0.594	0.621	0.405	0.474
		(0.137)***	(0.140)***	(0.118)***	(0.115)***
Inverse corruption (rescaled)			0.000	-0.000	0.000
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
UN Fee Assessment				0.509	0.473
				(0.127)***	(0.109)***
N	8519	7306	7170	5464	5464
r2	0.65	0.69	0.69	0.72	0.73

$^{*}p < 0.10,^{**}p < 0.05,^{***}p < 0.01$

The table shows coefficients from estimation of Equation 1, with the share of positions in the United Nations Secretariat as the dependent variable, and country fixed effects. Each observation is a country-year. The dependent variable in column 5 is the share of importance-weighted secretariat representation. Population, human capital and assessment of dues are represented as world shares.

Table 5

Additional Correlates of U.N. Secretariat Representation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Population share	0.022	0.064	0.056	0.018
	(0.058)	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.054)
Human capital share	0.173			0.241
	(0.043)***			(0.066)***
UN Fee Assessment		0.132		-0.128
		(0.078)*		(0.102)
Military spending share			0.111	0.001
			(0.045)**	(0.038)
Inverse corruption (rescaled)	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
GDP Per Capita (rescaled)	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Diplomatic contacts (share)	0.539	0.476	0.557	0.604
	(0.158)***	(0.175)***	(0.166)***	(0.150)***
Democracy (Polity, rescaled)	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001
	(0.001)*	(0.001)**	(0.001)**	(0.001)*
ODA share	0.122	0.165	0.168	0.159
	(0.062)*	(0.090)*	(0.078)**	(0.071)**
Constant	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
N	4615	5023	4937	4552
r2	0.55	0.53	0.53	0.55

$^{*}p < 0.10,^{**}p < 0.05,^{***}p < 0.01$

The table shows coefficients from estimation of Equation 1, with the share of positions in the United Nations Secretariat as the dependent variable. Each observation is a country-year. Population, human capital, assessment of dues, diplomatic contacts and military spending are represented as world shares. The freedom from corruption index, Polity score and per capita wealth are to mean 0 and standard deviation 1.

Figure 1

Excess Representation of World Powers Over Time in the U.N. Secretariat



The figure shows annual excess representation in the United Nations Secretariat of selected world powers over time. The y axis is a country's share of senior Secretariat positions divided by a country's share of world population.

Figure 2

Secretariat and Population Share of Western Europe and Offshoots



The figure shows, over time, the share of senior positions in the United Nations Secretariat held by Western Europe and its offshoots (United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand), and the world population share of these same powers.

Figure 3

Secretariat representation vs. population and GDP



The top panel plots the average share of secretariat positions held across all years against the average population of a country in all years. The solid line is a 45 degree line. Countries above the line are overrepresented in the secretariat relative to their population, while countries below the solid line are underrepresented. In the bottom panel, the X axis shows the assessment of dues to the United Nations. For readability, the graphs are presented on logarithmic scales, and the sample is limited to countries with population greater than 20 million, as well as the 20 most countries with the most senior positions in the Secretariat.

Figure 4

Secretariat affinity for USA



The figure shows how U.S. influence over the United Nations Secretariat has changed over time. The solid gray line (right axis) shows the share of senior positions in the Secretariat held by Americans. The solid black line (left axis) describes American influence over the Secretariat, defined by Equation 2. The dashed black line (left axis) describes what American influence over the Secretariat would look like if the affinity between states remained fixed at its 1950 level.

Figure 5

Secretariat bias toward USA

The graph shows the extent to which the staffing of the U.N. Secretariat is biased toward the United States. The y axis measures the difference in each year between the affinity of the world for the United States (based on population weighting) and the affinity of the U.N. Secretariat (based on staff positions) for the United States.

Figure 6

U.S. Bias of UNESCO and Secretariat



The graph shows the extent to which the staffing of UNESCO is biased toward the United States. The y axis measures the difference in each year between the affinity of the world for the United States (based on population weighting) and the affinity of UNESCO (based on staff positions) for the United States.

References

Ameri, Houshang. 1996. Politics of Staffing the United Nations Secretariat. New York: Peter Lang Publishing.

Bachrach, Peter & Morton S . Baratz. 1962. "Two Faces of Power." American Political Science Review 56(4):947–952.

Baldwin, David A. 2013. Power and International Relations. In Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carsnaes, Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons. London: Sage Publications Ltd. pp. 273–97.

Barnett, Michael N. & Martha Finnemore. 1999. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organization." International Organization 53(4):699–732.

Barnett, Michael & Raymond Duvall. 2005. "Power in International Politics." International Organization 59:39–75.

Barro, Robert J. & Jong Wha Lee. 2012. "A new data set of educational attainment in the world, 1950-2010." Journal of Development Economics 104:184–198.

Cameron, David. 2015. "Lord Mayor's Banquet 2015: Prime Minister's speech.".
URL: *https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/lord-mayors-banquet-2015-prime-ministers-speech*

Cline, Ray S. 1975. World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift. Boulder: Westview Press.

Copelovitch, Mark S. 2010. "Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending." International Studies Quarterly 54(1):49–77.

Cortell, A.P. & S. Peterson. 2006. Dutiful Agents, Rogue Actors, or Both? Staffing, Voting Rules and Slack in the WHO and WTO. In Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. Cambridge University Press.

Cox, Robert & Harold Jacobson. 1973. The Anatomy of Influence: Decision-making in International Organizations. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dahl, Robert. 1957. "The Concept of Power." Behavioral Science 2:201–15.

Economist, The. 1989. "A Case for Emergency Treatment." December 2.

Economist, The. 2014. "Why China is Creating a New World Bank for Asia." November 1.

Finger, Seymour Maxwell. 1975. The Politics of Staffing the United Nations Secretariat. New York: Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations.

Finger, Seymour Maxwell & Nina Hanan. 1980. "The UN Secretariat Revisited." UN Secretariat News October 16:9–12.

Fisman, Raymond & Edward Miguel. 2007. "Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets." Journal of Political Economy 115(6):1020–1048.

Gartzke, Erik. 1998. "Kant We All Just Get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace." American Journal of Political Science 42(1):1–27.

Gartzke, Erik. 2006. Affinity of Nations Index. [Dataset].

George, Aurelia. 1993. "Japan's Participation in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations: Radical Departure or Predictable Response?" Asian Survey 33(6):560–575.

Greenfield, Stanley. 1992. Who's Who in the United Nations and Related Agencies. Detroit: Omnigraphics Incorporated.

Gruber, Lloyd. 2000. Ruling the world: Power politics and the rise of supranational institutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Gulick, Edward. 1955. Europe's Classical Balance of Power. New York: W. W. Norton.

Guzzini, Stefano. 2009. "On the measure of power and the power of measure in International Relations." Danish Institute for International Studies Working Paper 2009:28.

Guzzini, Stefano. 2013. Power, Realism and Constructivism. New York: Routledge.

Harsanyi, John. 1962. "Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-person Bargaining Games." Behavioral Science 7:67–80.

Hawkins, D.G., D.A. Lake, D.L. Nielson & M.J. Tierney. 2006. Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. Cambridge University Press.

Hoopes, T & D Brinkley. 2000. FDR and the Creation of the UN. Yale University Press.

Ikenberry, GJ. 2001. "Getting hegemony right." The National Interest 63 (Spring).

Jacobson, Harold K. 1984. "U.S. Withdrawal From UNESCO: Incident, Warning, or Prelude?" PS: Political Science and Politics 17(3):581–585.

Johns, Leslie. 2007. "A Servant of Two Masters: Communication and the Selection of International Bureaucrats." International Organization 61(02):245–275.

Joyner, Christopher C. & Scott A. Lawson. 1986. "The United States and UNESCO: Rethinking the Decision to Withdraw." International Journal 41(1):37–71.

Kaja, Ashwin & Eric Werker. 2010. "Corporate Governance at the World Bank and the Dilemma of Global Governance." The World Bank Economic Review 24(2):171–198.

Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi. 2011. Worldwide Governance Indicators. [Dataset].

Kelen, Emery. 1968. Hammarskjold, The Political Man. New York: Funk and Wagnalls.

Kennedy, Paul M. 1989. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Vintage.

Keohane, Robert. 1984. After Hegemony. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kilby, Christopher. 2011. "Informal influence in the Asian Development Bank." Review of International Organizations 6:223–257.

Kuziemko, Ilyana & Eric Werker. 2006. "How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations." Journal of Political Economy 114(5):905–930.

Lieber, Robert J. 2012. Power and Willpower in the American Future: Why the United States is not Destined to Decline. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lim, Daniel Yew Mao & James Raymond Vreeland. 2013. "Regional Organizations and International Politics: Japanese Influence over the Asian Development Bank and the UN Security Council." World Politics 65(01):34–72.

Lukes, Steven. 1974. Power: A Radical View. New York: MacMillan.

Marshall, Monty G. & Keith Jaggers. 2002. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002. [Dataset].

Mearsheimer, John J. 1994. "The False Promise of International Institutions." International Security 19(3):5–49.

Meron, Theodor. 1982. "Charter Powers of the United Nations' Secretary-General with regard to the Secretariat and the Role of General Assembly Resolutions." Heidelberg Journal of International Law 42.

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1993. "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach." Journal of Common Market Studies 31(4).

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." International Organization 51(04).

Morgenthau, Hans. 1948. Politics Among Nations. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Nexon, Daniel H. & Thomas Wright. 2007. "What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate." American Political Science Review 101(02):253–271.

Nye, Joseph S. 1990. "Soft Power." Foreign Policy 80:153–71.

Nye, Joseph S. 2011a. "The Decline and Fall of America's Decline and Fall." Project Syndicate . October 6.

Nye, Joseph S. 2011b. The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs.

Puchala, Donald J. 1990. "Hope and Folly: The United States and UNESCO 1945-1985. by William Preston, Edward Herman and Herbert Schiller." Political Science Quarterly 105(3):497–498.

Reymond, Henri. 1967. "The Staffing of the United Nations Secretariat: A Continuing Discussion." International Organization 21(4):751–767.

Rhamey, Patrick, Kirssa Cline, Sverre Bodung, Alexis Henshaw, Beau James, Chansuk Kang, Alicia Sedziak, Aakriti Tandon & Thomas J. Volgy. 2010. Diplomatic Contacts Database (DIPCON) v1.1. [Dataset].

Rodrik, Dani. 2014. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments ?" Journal of Political Economy 106(5):997–1032.

Rubenfeld, Jed. 2004. "Unilateralism and constitutionalism." New York University Law Review 79(6).

Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2001. "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union." International Organization 55(1).

Simmons, Beth, Frank Dobbin & Geoffrey Garrett. 2006. "Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism." International Organization 60(4).

Singer, J. David. 1987. "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985." International Interactions 14:115–32.

Steinberg, Richard H. 2002. "In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO." International Organization 56(2).

Stone, R. W. 2011. Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy. Cambridge University Press.

Stone, Randall W. 2004. "The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa." The American Political Science Review 98(4):577–591.

Tellis, Ashley J., Janice Bially, Christopher Layne & Melissa McPherson. 2000. Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Thant, Myint-U & Amy Scott. 2007. The UN Secretariat: A Brief History. New York: International Peace Academy.

Turner, Mark. 2007. "U.N. chief gives out top jobs." Financial Times February 7.

United Nations. 1945. Yearbook of the United Nations. New York: United Nations.

United Nations. 2005. Independent Inquiry Committee Into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme. Technical report.

United States Senate. 1985. "Soviet Presence in the U.N. Secretariat." Senate Select Comittee on Intelligence, United States Senate.

Voeten, Erik. 2013. Data and Analyses of Voting in the United Nations General Assembly. In Routledge Handbook of International Organizations, ed. Robert Reinalda. Routledge pp. 54–66.

Watt, Nicholas. 2010. "Lady Amos given top UN humanitarian affairs job." The Guardian July 9.

Wynes, M Deborah & Mohamed Mounir Zahran. 2011. "Transparency in the Selection and Appointment of Senior Managers in the United Nations Secretariat." Report of the United Nations: Joint Inspection Unit.

Zakaria, F. 1999. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role. Princeton University Press.

A Appendix

Table A1

Secretariat excess representation, all countries, average over all years

Rank	Country	Share of positions	Share of world population	Excess Representation
1	Sweden	0.0428	0.0015	21.67
2	Norway	0.0180	0.0007	18.69
3	Finland	0.0206	0.0009	17.90
4	New Zealand	0.0114	0.0006	15.97
5	Ireland	0.0109	0.0006	13.67
6	Denmark	0.0150	0.0009	12.43
7	Panama	0.0050	0.0005	11.68
8	Jamaica	0.0047	0.0004	9.72
9	Switzerland	0.0118	0.0012	7.93
10	Uruguay	0.0053	0.0005	7.68
11	Sierra Leone	0.0056	0.0007	7.44
12	Jordan	0.0037	0.0008	7.27
13	Canada	0.0382	0.0051	6.93
14	Ghana	0.0178	0.0032	6.75
15	Botswana	0.0015	0.0003	6.63
16	Greece	0.0149	0.0018	6.62
17	Chile	0.0161	0.0025	6.38
18	Austria	0.0117	0.0013	6.38
19	Tunisia	0.0083	0.0016	5.70
20	Senegal	0.0068	0.0016	5.27
21	Burundi	0.0052	0.0011	5.16
22	Australia	0.0150	0.0031	4.55
23	Netherlands	0.0146	0.0026	4.50
24	United Kingdom	0.0581	0.0097	4.28
25	Somalia	0.0047	0.0012	4.12
26	Costa Rica	0.0021	0.0006	3.96
27	Sri Lanka	0.0125	0.0031	3.89
28	Namibia	0.0009	0.0003	3.73
29	Argentina	0.0224	0.0061	3.49
30	Niger	0.0050	0.0018	3.48
31	Singapore	0.0020	0.0007	3.45
32	Taiwan	0.0122	0.0036	3.26
33	Guatemala	0.0048	0.0018	3.05
34	Belgium	0.0070	0.0017	2.97
35	Czech Republic	0.0067	0.0017	2.75
36	France	0.0343	0.0097	2.72
37	Cameroon	0.0055	0.0026	2.57
38	United States	0.1292	0.0464	2.46
39	Peru	0.0091	0.0043	2.39
40	Haiti	0.0028	0.0014	2.14
41	Ecuador	0.0037	0.0020	2.09
42	Liberia	0.0008	0.0005	2.03
43	Venezuela	0.0065	0.0040	2.02
44	Italy	0.0264	0.0094	2.00
45	Burkina Faso	0.0032	0.0019	1.90
46	Egypt	0.0173	0.0115	1.70
47	Algeria	0.0071	0.0050	1.68
48	Yemen	0.0035	0.0030	1.61
49	Lebanon	0.0010	0.0006	1.57
50	Iraq	0.0047	0.0041	1.51
51	Colombia	0.0082	0.0065	1.39
52	Pakistan	0.0259	0.0227	1.37
53	Poland	0.0100	0.0063	1.23
54	Bolivia	0.0015	0.0014	1.20
55	Hungary	0.0029	0.0017	1.17

56	Myanmar	0.0085	0.0077	1.14
57	Malaysia	0.0036	0.0038	1.13
58	Mali	0.0018	0.0017	1.10
59	Slovak Republic	0.0012	0.0009	1.05
60	Guinea	0.0012	0.0014	1.04
61	Syria	0.0020	0.0027	0.99
62	South Africa	0.0060	0.0072	0.95
63	Germany	0.0158	0.0135	0.84
64	Iran	0.0072	0.0105	0.82
65	Nepal	0.0028	0.0040	0.80
66	Philippines	0.0085	0.0128	0.79
67	Japan	0.0206	0.0208	0.78
68	Nigeria	0.0131	0.0205	0.78
69	Russian Federation	0.0237	0.0240	0.74
70	Togo	0.0005	0.0009	0.72
71	Lesotho	0.0002	0.0003	0.71
72	Portugal	0.0016	0.0017	0.70
73	El Salvador	0.0007	0.0010	0.70
74	Bulgaria	0.0014	0.0013	0.68
75	Sudan	0.0030	0.0057	0.66
76	Tanzania	0.0029	0.0056	0.66
77	Zimbabwe	0.0011	0.0020	0.66
78	Mexico	0.0091	0.0161	0.63
79	Uganda	0.0017	0.0040	0.57
80	Saudi Arabia	0.0013	0.0034	0.57
81	Spain	0.0048	0.0066	0.57
82	Cuba	0.0012	0.0018	0.54
83	Brazil	0.0131	0.0286	0.49
84	Eritrea	0.0003	0.0006	0.47
85	Turkey	0.0045	0.0109	0.44
86	Korea, Rep.	0.0034	0.0077	0.42
87	Kenya	0.0012	0.0052	0.32
88	Chad	0.0003	0.0014	0.29
89	India	0.0447	0.1670	0.29
90	Indonesia	0.0055	0.0337	0.17
91	Bangladesh	0.0032	0.0231	0.16
92	Thailand	0.0008	0.0102	0.08
93	Mozambique	0.0002	0.0030	0.06
94	Ethiopia	0.0005	0.0108	0.05
95	China	0.0086	0.2075	0.04
96	Afghanistan	0.0000	0.0039	0.00
96	Albania	0.0000	0.0005	0.00
96	Angola	0.0000	0.0023	0.00
96	Armenia	0.0000	0.0005	0.00
96	Azerbaijan	0.0000	0.0013	0.00
96	Belarus	0.0000	0.0016	0.00
96	Benin	0.0000	0.0011	0.00
96	Bosnia And Herzegovina	0.0000	0.0006	0.00
96	Cambodia	0.0000	0.0021	0.00
96	Central African Republic	0.0000	0.0006	0.00
96	Congo, Dem. Rep.	0.0000	0.0084	0.00
96	Congo, Rep.	0.0000	0.0005	0.00
96	Cote D'Ivoire	0.0000	0.0028	0.00
96	Croatia	0.0000	0.0007	0.00
96	Dominican Republic	0.0000	0.0015	0.00
96	Estonia	0.0000	0.0002	0.00
96	Georgia	0.0000	0.0008	0.00
96	Honduras	0.0000	0.0010	0.00
96	Israel	0.0000	0.0010	0.00
96	Kazakhstan	0.0000	0.0024	0.00
96	Korea, Dem. Rep.	0.0000	0.0038	0.00
96	Kosovo	0.0000	0.0003	0.00
96	Kuwait	0.0000	0.0004	0.00

96	Kyrgyz Republic	0.0000	0.0008	0.00
96	Laos	0.0000	0.0009	0.00
96	Latvia	0.0000	0.0004	0.00
96	Libya	0.0000	0.0009	0.00
96	Lithuania	0.0000	0.0006	0.00
96	Macedonia	0.0000	0.0003	0.00
96	Madagascar	0.0000	0.0025	0.00
96	Malawi	0.0000	0.0019	0.00
96	Mauritania	0.0000	0.0004	0.00
96	Moldova	0.0000	0.0007	0.00
96	Mongolia	0.0000	0.0004	0.00
96	Morocco	0.0000	0.0047	0.00
96	Nicaragua	0.0000	0.0008	0.00
96	Oman	0.0000	0.0004	0.00
96	Papua New Guinea	0.0000	0.0009	0.00
96	Paraguay	0.0000	0.0009	0.00
96	Puerto Rico	0.0000	0.0006	0.00
96	Romania	0.0000	0.0037	0.00
96	Rwanda	0.0000	0.0013	0.00
96	Serbia	0.0000	0.0012	0.00
96	Slovenia	0.0000	0.0003	0.00
96	Tajikistan	0.0000	0.0010	0.00
96	Trinidad And Tobago	0.0000	0.0002	0.00
96	Turkmenistan	0.0000	0.0007	0.00
96	Ukraine	0.0000	0.0081	0.00
96	United Arab Emirates	0.0000	0.0005	0.00
96	Uzbekistan	0.0000	0.0041	0.00
96	Vietnam	0.0000	0.0128	0.00
96	West Bank And Gaza	0.0000	0.0005	0.00
96	Zambia	0.0000	0.0017	0.00

Table A2

Secretariat raw representation, average share over all years

Rank	Country	Share of positions
1	United States	0.1292
2	United Kingdom	0.0581
3	India	0.0447
4	Sweden	0.0428
5	Canada	0.0382
6	France	0.0343
7	Italy	0.0264
8	Pakistan	0.0259
9	Russian Federation	0.0237
10	Argentina	0.0224
12	Finland	0.0206
13	Japan	0.0206
14	Norway	0.0180
15	Ghana	0.0178
16	Egypt	0.0173
17	Chile	0.0161
18	Germany	0.0158
19	Australia	0.0150
20	Denmark	0.0150
21	Greece	0.0149
22	Netherlands	0.0146
23	Nigeria	0.0131
24	Brazil	0.0131
25	Sri Lanka	0.0125
26	Taiwan	0.0122
27	Switzerland	0.0118
28	Austria	0.0117
29	New Zealand	0.0114
30	Ireland	0.0109
31	Poland	0.0100
32	Mexico	0.0091
33	Peru	0.0091
34	China	0.0086
35	Philippines	0.0085
36	Myanmar	0.0085
37	Tunisia	0.0083
38	Colombia	0.0082
39	Iran	0.0072
40	Algeria	0.0071
41	Belgium	0.0070
42	Senegal	0.0068
43	Czech Republic	0.0067
44	Venezuela	0.0065
45	South Africa	0.0060
46	Sierra Leone	0.0056
47	Cameroon	0.0055
48	Indonesia	0.0055
49	Uruguay	0.0053
50	Burundi	0.0052
51	Panama	0.0050
52	Niger	0.0050
53	Spain	0.0048
54	Guatemala	0.0048
55	Iraq	0.0047
56	Jamaica	0.0047
57	Somalia	0.0047
58	Turkey	0.0045
59	Jordan	0.0037
60	Ecuador	0.0037

Table A2

Secretariat raw representation, average share over all years

Rank	Country	Share of positions
61	Malaysia	0.0036
62	Yemen	0.0035
63	Korea, Rep.	0.0034
64	Bangladesh	0.0032
65	Burkina Faso	0.0032
66	Sudan	0.0030
67	Hungary	0.0029
68	Tanzania	0.0029
69	Nepal	0.0028
70	Haiti	0.0028
71	Costa Rica	0.0021
72	Syria	0.0020
73	Singapore	0.0020
74	Mali	0.0018
75	Uganda	0.0017
76	Portugal	0.0016
77	Bolivia	0.0015
78	Botswana	0.0015
79	Bulgaria	0.0014
80	Saudi Arabia	0.0013
81	Kenya	0.0012
82	Slovak Republic	0.0012
83	Guinea	0.0012
84	Cuba	0.0012
85	Zimbabwe	0.0011
86	Lebanon	0.0010
87	Namibia	0.0009
88	Liberia	0.0008
89	Thailand	0.0008
90	El Salvador	0.0007
91	Togo	0.0005
92	Ethiopia	0.0005
93	Chad	0.0003
94	Eritrea	0.0003
95	Lesotho	0.0002
96	Mozambique	0.0002
97	Afghanistan	0.0000
97	Angola	0.0000
97	Albania	0.0000
97	United Arab Emirates	0.0000
97	Armenia	0.0000
97	Azerbaijan	0.0000
97	Benin	0.0000
97	Bosnia And Herzegovina	0.0000
97	Belarus	0.0000
97	Central African Republic	0.0000
97	Cote D'Ivoire	0.0000
97	Congo, Rep.	0.0000
97	Dominican Republic	0.0000
97	Estonia	0.0000
97	Georgia	0.0000
97	Honduras	0.0000
97	Croatia	0.0000
97	Israel	0.0000
97	Kazakhstan	0.0000
97	Kyrgyz Republic	0.0000
97	Cambodia	0.0000
97	Kosovo	0.0000
97	Kuwait	0.0000

Table A2

Secretariat raw representation, average share over all years

Rank	Country	Share of positions
97	Laos	0.0000
97	Libya	0.0000
97	Lithuania	0.0000
97	Latvia	0.0000
97	Morocco	0.0000
97	Moldova	0.0000
97	Madagascar	0.0000
97	Macedonia	0.0000
97	Mongolia	0.0000
97	Mauritania	0.0000
97	Malawi	0.0000
97	Nicaragua	0.0000
97	Oman	0.0000
97	Papua New Guinea	0.0000
97	Puerto Rico	0.0000
97	Korea, Dem. Rep.	0.0000
97	Paraguay	0.0000
97	Romania	0.0000
97	Rwanda	0.0000
97	Serbia	0.0000
97	Slovenia	0.0000
97	Tajikistan	0.0000
97	Turkmenistan	0.0000
97	Trinidad And Tobago	0.0000
97	Ukraine	0.0000
97	Uzbekistan	0.0000
97	Vietnam	0.0000
97	West Bank And Gaza	0.0000
97	Congo, Dem. Rep.	0.0000
97	Zambia	0.0000

Figure A1

Number of positions listed and identified in U.N. Yearbook



The figure shows the number of positions listed in the Appendix of the U.N. Yearbook, "Key Staff of the U.N. Secretariat," along with the number of those position-holders that were matched to nationalities.

Figure A2

Raw Representation of World Powers Over Time in the U.N. Secretariat



The figure shows annual raw representation in the United Nations Secretariat of selected world powers over time. The y axis is raw representation, defined as the total number of senior positions held by citizens of a given country.